Introduction
The Purpose of this document is to "To undertake a rapid desk based study to identify evidence on institutional/political considerations linking large-scale energy investments and economic growth to inform a DFID research project".
This review is based on DFID's draft Business Proposition: Energy and Economic Growth in Low Income Countries (EEG), and is intended to inform the development of the more detailed Business Case.
The method of the review has been to draw heavily on the material produced by the author when reviewing the political economy literature related to the energy sector in Africa for the EPSRC research project on Agro-Industries and Cleaner Energy (AGRICEN) Project 1 . While no attempt has been made at a "systematic" review it should be noted that there is a relative dearth of "academic literature" on some of these issues. But this is amply made up with the literature from "practitioners" such as The World Bank (especially from ESMAP) and consultants' reports.
What is Political Economy Analysis and why is it needed?
The terms of reference note that "recent consultations have flagged the importance of political economy considerations in the area of energy and economic growth research". The development community has certainly begun to focus on why so many good ideas and technically competent plans associated with international development are often inadequately implemented. This concern has led a number of agencies to examine the political processes by which aid policies are implemented. To quote one of the key initial papers associated with the revival of this perspective, "DFID and other donors find it easier to say "what" needs to be done to reduce poverty than "how" to make it happen. … We tend to see the obstacles as being 'lack of political will ', or 
vested interests against reform, or lack of capacity and resources to implement policy. But are other factors at work? … Where are the levers, and the obstacles? What historically has driven the process in other countries, and is that experience replicable? … We need to be able to look beyond the current policy environment and to take a longer term view of the underlying factors which shape the incentives and capacities for pro-poor change"
2 . This view led DFID to refer to this 'new' approach as the Drivers of Change. But this approach is now more widely known under its new label of the 'new political economy analysis' and it has flourished. It is now described as a multi-disciplinary field of enquiry which seeks to combine the insights of the older political economy with the 'new institutional economics' and the study of social processes, cultural norms and ethnicity.
Even in the world of electricity system reform and the desired shift to low carbon energy, the conventional wisdom now frequently explains the relative lack of progress in terms of the 1 http://www.surrey.ac.uk/features/could-agro-industries-help-answer-africa%E2%80%99s-energy-problem 2 "Understanding Pro-Poor Change: A Discussion Paper", by Sue Unsworth, DFID, Sept 2001. constraints of 'political economy' rather than due to other more traditional constraints such as the lack of capital or technical capacity alone.
Political economy has a long history since the early 19 th Century and is associated with the work of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx. But if this review is restrict to what might be called the 'new political economy analysis', and what DFID describes as the Drivers of Change, the essence of the approach has been summarised in two central propositions:
In order to understand how policies favourable to development can be put in place it is essential to analyse the incentives that influence the decisions of governing elites, other powerful interest groups and change agents in civil society, the private sector and the government bureaucracy. The nature of incentives and interests, both formal and informal, provides a large part of the explanation of why many governments pursue policies that are damaging to development. This approach can help to identify conditions that make it more likely that governments will adopt policies and programmes in favour of broad-based economic growth and poverty reduction rather than to pursue policies that continue to benefit predominantly the narrow interests of the governing elite and their supporters. These incentives result from the pursuit of economic interests and the restraints of formal institutions. They are also heavily dependent on the informal social rules that govern behaviour, define the social hierarchy, create and perpetuate embedded power structures and generate reciprocal social obligations, often shaped and perpetuated by historical, cultural and ethnic influences. These are often described as the 'rules of the game'.
An annotated bibliography of these and many other papers on the political economy perspective are available from the Policy Practice Library 
For them "in its modern form, political economy studies refer to the study of the relations between political and economic processes which involve several factors such as incentives, relationships, and the distribution of power between various interest groups in society, all of whom have an impact on development outcomes. The fundamental idea is that to understand economic (development) performance, there is a need to understand first the politics that shapes it. ….Political Economy studies attempt to understand how political constraints (which arise from the need to make collective choice while dealing with conflicting and heterogeneous interests, and opportunistic behaviours) may explain the choice of economic policies (which are different from optimal policies) and how they affect the economic outcomes".

In their view "PE analysis attempts to understand the reasons why certain essential policies or programs are not being implemented, hence not resulting in desired development outcomes. The reluctance to implement such policies and programs is generally not based on economic considerations but is influenced largely by political considerations. Such political considerations could include the desire of policymakers to stay in power; to enrich themselves financially; to prevent political opponents from gaining power; and to dispense favours to supporters by preventing the introduction of new technologies, or improvements in the property rights of workers or competitors".
But these simple views are inevitably subject to criticism, particularly by 'real political scientists' who see a need for greater rigour and complexity. One of the most important reviews of this kind is Hudson and Leftwich and came out in June 2014 5 . This paper provides a most valuable and well-informed critique of the political economy approach to date. While they are highly praising of some aspects of the current work that "pulled down the wall between development and politics" (p19), they argue that much of it neglects some key elements of political science, is conceptually ill-defined and massively over simplifies the real and messy world of politics". In particular they argue "that existing political economy approaches lack the analytical tools needed to grasp the inner politics of development.
Political economy has come to be seen narrowly as the economics of politics -the way incentives shape behaviour. Much recent political economy work therefore misses what is distinctively political about politics -power, interests, agency, ideas, the subtleties of building and sustaining coalitions, and the role of contingency" (p5).
For them "Politics, not capital or knowledge, is the binding constraint" (p29). "The tools failed to deliver operationally relevant recommendations for how to bring about successful political reform. Their analysis and conclusions were too general, and did not provide practical guidance to donors for how to work politically" (p27).
At the centre of their analysis and the conceptual tools they use "is a relentless focus on power".. They believe that the stress on 'incentives', such as that provided by the two sources at the start of this paper, "almost entirely evades the issue of power, which is so central to how politics happens" (p47) and presents "incentives and institutions as rather technical innovations or interventions". And they draw particular attention to the importance of "contingency" in the sense of future events or circumstances which are possible but cannot be predicted with certainty. . All effective development practitioners try to identify who might support their work, who might oppose it, and how to communicate to the interested parties to see if they can form a progressive alliance for change. Such approaches were routinely used by the UK Civil Service 7 .
.. "Power is embedded in structures; it shapes and is framed by institutions
A number of conclusions emerge at this stage. First there is now a substantial literature establishing that many of the constraints to the effective implementation of 'development' are associated with what is described as the 'political economy'. Second, as we suggested in the next section, such issues apply with considerable force to developments in large energy investments and change. And third that while a relatively superficial analysis of incentives and interest groups provides considerable insight into policy interventions that work, there remains a question as to how 'deep' the analysis has to be to be useful.
But it is also important to end this section by noting that, in addition to political economy analyses of particular sectors, there is also an expanding literature on the fundamentals of African politics. And it must be accepted that the over-arching political environment in Africa may not be conducive to change. For instance, the work of David Booth and others at ODI warns that "EAC countries must be expected to exhibit, ....'limited access orders'. That is, the relationship between political and economic power will be close and strongly shaped by 6 Quoted by Hudson and Leftwich, page 28 
Political economy analysis and big energy
The focus of this paper is on the Political Economy of Large Energy Investments. But it is important to note in passing that the literature on the political economy and growth has been subject to much useful review and synthesis
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. Similarly much is already documented in terms of the relationships between growth and infrastructure projects 10 , between infrastructure and poverty
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, and between the impacts of electricity on poverty reduction.
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There has been a trend in recent political economy analysis towards what has been called "problem focussed" political economy analysis, to distinguish it from macro level or national level political economy. The PEA of Modern Energy Service forms one vibrant sub-set of this literature.
The modern energy sector appears to be an ideal candidate for such analysis: progress in regulatory reform has been modest; large oil, gas and electricity systems are characterised by huge financial flows and the concentration of decision making in relatively few hands; and they are sub-sectors that have long histories opacity and dirty dealing. Furthermore all energy systems, whether predominantly in the public or private sector, need some form of regulation and are subject to important tax and subsidy regimes, all of which are associated with lobbying, rent seeking and winners and losers.
Corruption and the energy sector
Perhaps the starting point for political economy analysis in the energy sector is the recognition that it is a sector that has always been highly politicised. Even in colonial times the power sector, for instance, was known as the most corrupt institution in the empire (large contracts, opaque contract awarding systems, the use of aid to win sales for Northern suppliers). Furthermore the location of distribution and transmission lines were often decided by politicians wishing to win votes rather than according to where the greatest demand was or would be. Tariffs were also kept low (below cost) because raising tariffs were seen as politically unattractive. Utilities became large employers and utility posts became part of the patronage system. All this conspired to produce very large and largely unplanned financial losses for the utility which had to be covered by government revenues, and ultimately formed a huge part of government expenditure. As financial losses rose so maintenance was cut back and spares could not be bought. This added to the downward spiral of poor service provision. As demand exceeded supply, planned and unplanned supply outages (and "brown outs") became increasingly common (reducing further people's willingness to pay for a rubbish service) 13 .
In a few countries tariffs have risen to levels that cover costs (as in Kenya). But this has had the effect of passing the cost of inefficiency (and huge profit taking from emergency power suppliers) to consumers. This in turn choked off demand, and reduced the impact that electricity could have on development.
Corruption has also been alleged in the international energy companies, both in the oil sector but also in the supply of generation and other equipment. Various efforts have been put in place to avoid the worst excesses including the transparency of tendering insisted upon by the World Bank, but also in legislation such as the UK The Bribery Act 2010 which has almost universal jurisdiction, allowing for the prosecution of an individual or company with links to the United Kingdom, regardless of where the crime occurred.
While very few sources could be found that specifically addressed the political economy of corruption in the energy sector 14 , there is a considerable literature in general, which is likely to address issues in the energy sector. And an example of political economy and corruption in the power sector by K. P. Kannan and N. Vijayamohanan Pillai, who sought to understand the political economy of power utilities in Kerala, in South India in 2001 . Much of the research sets out to document the "corruption channels" and to quantify the level of theft in many parts of the Indian power sector. They attach great importance to "a vigilant civil society, fully conscious of and committed to its duties and rights, to act as a watchdog in the common interest. However, the emergence of such a civil society cannot be spontaneous, but has to be striven for by conscious public praxis in toto. Although we recognise the exertion of such public praxis by a few concerned citizens and their organisations, the challenge is so enormous that it calls for much greater intensification of efforts so as to eliminate, at the least, the scope for rent seeking". But more recently there has been a burgeoning of papers that apply the political economy perspective to the energy sector. Given the importance attached to these issues by both The World Bank, DFID and other donors many more can be expected in the coming months. Each of the themes identified in the "framing" above have been viewed through the 'political economy lens' perspective generating 'key literature' and using 'recognised methodologies'.
Political economy and Fossil Fuels
Oil and the "resource curse"
A particularly important area of this analysis has focussed on the political economy of gas, oil and extractive minerals more generally. This has had a long history and has been frequently summarised in terms of the so-called 'Resource Curse', in Nigeria and elsewhere in which countries appear poorer on many indices after finding oil and gas than before. This area of analysis has also gained new impetus with the finds of solid, liquid and gaseous fossil fuels in Ghana, Uganda, Ethiopia/Kenya, Tanzania and elsewhere 19 ). Even for those agencies that focus on low carbon find that fossil fuels often represent the base case, against which low carbon options have to be compared 20 .
There is a great deal of literature on this topic that is too large to review here, ranging from technical manuals on best practice how countries should ideally cope with the potentially large financial flows from new finds of oil and gas, through the huge effort of The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 21 , through to political economy analyses of the consequences of fossil fuel income flows.
Typical of this perspective is contained in the recent IEA report on energy in Africa which noted that in Nigeria, "The wide-ranging Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), which was first drafted corruption is widespread are Greece (99%), Italy (97%), Lithuania, Spain and the Czech Republic (95% in each). A 2013 study on identifying and reducing corruption in public procurement in the EU concluded that in 2010 the overall direct costs of corruption in public procurement for only five sectors (i.e. road and rail; water and waste; urban/utility construction; training; research and development) in eight Member States25 ranged from EUR 1.4 billion up to EUR 2.2 billion Construction, energy, transport, defence and healthcare sectors appear to be most vulnerable to corruption in public procurement. Launched in 2002 to improve transparency and accountability in countries rich in oil, gas, and mineral resources, EITI has been guided by a set of principles and criteria that provides a framework and monitoring mechanism under which resource-rich countries can ensure the transparency of revenue ows from their natural resource sectors. At the global level, the EITI is a coalition of Governments, companies, civil society, institutional investors and international organizations. At the level of a participating country, its key organs are an implementation leader (often from Government) and a multi-stakeholder committee that comprises the Government, locally operating companies and civil society; the committee may also include parliamentarians and the media. , provides a fascinating insight into the role of western donors efforts to 'reform' Angola after the civil war. A stand-off between the Government and western donors' loan conditionality was broken by the intervention of the Chinese who offered an infrastructure loan in 2004 through the Chinese ExIm Bank at the very cheap non-conditions asked rate of 2.55% above Libor (P273).
But there is also a new strand of work using political economy analysis to consider oil developments in Africa that might constitute an intellectual break from the resource curse approach. This sees oil as merely an 'idiom for doing politics...inserted into an already existing political landscape of forces, identities, and forms of power' (Watts 2004: 76 
Coal
Despite a great deal of political activity by donors to foster low carbon strategies, political realities on the ground tell a somewhat different story. The IEA states that coal remains the second largest commercial fuel in Africa (after oil The political economy effect of cheap South African coal on other parts of Africa is profound and widespread. Not least of the reasons for this is the trade-off between low carbon and low cost electricity services. This can be illustrated by the case of the Chinese private company that supplies electricity to the grid in Ghana. The Sunon Asogli Power Ghana Ltd (SAPGL), currently supplies 180 megawatts of electricity to the Ghana grid using gas from the West African Gas Pipeline, which in 2003 was14 per cent of the power distributed by the utility to consumers. But the company has plans to construct a 700 megawatt coal fired plant, as coal is "said to be far cheaper than gas", and producing "a 10 per cent return rate per annum"
25
.
Similarly a recent piece in The Nairobi Business Monthly presented coal as the next big thing in Kenya. The article says that "the coal deposits in Kitui are billed to be the best alternative source of cheaper energy to drive Vision 2030, the long term development blueprint which aims to make Kenya an industrialised country. It will also be a huge revenue earner for the government"
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Politics of the fossil fuel subsidies.
Perhaps the most archetypal issue of energy and political economy relates to fossil fuel subsidies. There is widespread agreement that they are harmful to the economy and to the environment, and it is accepted that for reasons of political economy they are very difficult to remove. Source: Daily Graphic, graphic.com.gh/.../8015-gas-flows-from-west-african-gas-pipeline-tosunon-asogli-plant.html, 22 JUL 2013. 26 This article was brought to my attention by Dr Ana Pueyo (IDS) . The article also notes that "The coal project has been dogged by controversies since the concession was awarded two years ago with numerous court cases filed by the local community demanding to be involved in negotiations. Kitui Governor Dr Julius Malombe says his government will take a lead role in facilitating dialogue among all players to ensure that they get the best deals while safeguarding the environment". Posted on September 1, 2014 by Zadock Malika, http://nairobibusinessmonthly.com/coal-war-kitui-mines An IMF study estimated global fossil fuel subsidies were $1.9 trillion a year, equivalent to 2.5 percent of global GDP. This included some $488 billion-roughly a quarter-in "direct" or consumer subsidies, those provided mostly in developing countries to hold down consumer prices. The far larger share, however, was so-called "indirect" subsidies-the lack of taxation on emissions corresponding to the damage that they were inflicting. The IMF included in these damages "the effects of energy consumption on global warming; on public health through the adverse effects on local pollution; on traffic congestion and accidents; and on road damage." These the IMF estimated to be $1.4 trillion per year 27 . Indonesia represents an example where energy subsidies are the central issue of energy policy. Subsidies are paid both on fuel and electricity tariffs, such that liquid fuel prices in Indonesia are approximately a third the price in countries such as China, Thailand and the Philippines. Even though subsidies are no longer paid on fuel to industries, the amounts involved are still huge. 2012 spending on fuel subsidies totalled (USD17.08bn). This was more than the central government's capital spending and social spending combined. It was three times the central government's expenditure on infrastructure 28 . Many efforts have been made to curb subsidies but the efforts are largely ad hoc and are hotly contested, such that, for instance, the plans to reduce the subsidy in 2011-12 had to be reversed.
The distortions resulting from the large subsidies are also well documented and widely known 29 . But subsidy reform usually requires some form of compensation, particularly for the poorest people who are affected. But in many countries, including Indonesia the general population are said to have little faith in cash transfers which are easily diverted. In Indonesia the current subsidies are captured by households with the highest consumption. Less than 1% of the subsidies go to the poorest 10%. Current forms of regulation are said to send conflicting messages to PLN from MEMR on one side and the Ministry of Finance on the other. The current mechanism of regulation does not incentivise PLN to engage in grid extension in the remoter areas 30 .
Again there is a vast literature on this topic, and much of it has a political economy perspective which identifies groups of winners and losers. Much of this literature has been reviewed, summarised or generated by the Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI) http://www.iisd.org/gsi/about-gsi. The GSI's goal is to encourage individual governments to undertake unilateral reforms on subsidy policy where these would deliver clear economic, environmental and social benefits and to generate a consensus in the World Trade Organization and in other forums on the need to take resolute, ongoing and systematic action to reduce or eliminate subsidies that are both trade-distorting and undermine sustainable development. The GSI has received project funding from numerous governments, United Nations agencies, and foundations. The GSI's current research into fossil-fuel subsidies is supported by the governments of Denmark, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The GSI has also been contracted for specific projects by Greenpeace, Nestle, the OECD, OPEC, UNEP, and the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research on Trade (NCCR). The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation also contributes funding for research and communications activities.
The Political Economy of Power sector reform
In the electrical power sector, 'sector reform' has rightly been the major focus of attention for over twenty years, and represents another archetypal example of political economy. The problems are well known, and the need for reform widely accepted, but the difficulty of achieving reform has proven very difficult and highly political.
In the late 1980's it became clear to the donors that official development assistance was not sufficient to fund the total volume of capital required for an effective electrification programme in most developing countries. Attracting private capital was therefore seen primarily a tactical necessity. But it also rapidly became an ideological necessity. Thus this 'new' tactical necessity coincided with the Reagan/Thatcher era, and sector reform efforts to make power utilities attractive to private capital often became highly ideological and were often confused with wholesale efforts to 'privatise' the power sector.
The World Bank took the position that it would not provide more funds for capital investment until power sector reform had been implemented. While the World Bank never provided more than a small percentage of the total capital for power sector investment (estimated to be between 4 and 10 % in the 1980's), it was hugely influential in power sector planning and project preparation. Most donors would only invest in electricity schemes that the Bank approved. Therefore the change in Bank policy effectively cut off official development assistance to new build (the exception was the Asian Development Bank which under Japanese influence continued to support direct public investment).
The direct result of this technical and political decision was a massive under investment in the power sector in Africa -the so-called "lost decades"
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. Reform was inadequate and the response from the foreign private sector was very disappointing 33 . So while there has been some progress in power sector reform it has not yet been sufficient to attract anything like the required levels of private investment; its primary objective. Indeed sector reform in Africa may never be sufficient to attract the required level of investment from the international private sector (who clearly have more profitable and safer investment possibilities elsewhere).
This context draws attention to the important but under studied political economy of donor behaviour in the energy sector. Donors represent a huge political force in the energy sector, not only in switching emphasis from construction of plant to sector reform, but also switching from energy related to poverty reduction to low carbon development. Furthermore the role of 32 Whether or not this was a sensible strategy in theory, it proved unfortunate in practice. Unfortunately the World Bank adopted a very particular form of privatisation, based largely on the UK model, involving unbundling of the system in order to promote competition between generators. This model involves many generators, many distributors and a single transmission company (often owned by the state). Often this model was resisted in Africa because it did not make sense in the smaller systems of Africa where their generation capacities were too small to divide up so as to obtain the necessary degree of competition. Unusually for the World Bank they apologised for their inappropriate "one-size-fits-all" approach to power sector reform and recommended a more nuanced approach that was less ideological and more pragmatic to using a mix of public and private capital in the power sector. The changed Bank policy was reflected in an operational guidance note to staff: Public and Private Sector Roles in the Supply of Electricity Services: Operational Guidance for Bank Group Staff, January 2004.
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The private investment that did occur in the power sector mostly occurred in South East Asia, and the exploitative terms of some early private sector investments (particularly associated with ENRON) also did not help the argument for private suppliers of capital. In Kenya some of the initial investors have had to reduce their excessive prices overtime.
China both as an official government agency, but also as a new breed of entrepreneurs alters the political power balance of the energy sector. (Boone,1996: 322) 
The centrality of political economy in power sector reform is made very forcefully in recent paper by Griff Thompson and others 34 that explicitly explores the links between 'governance' and 'energy access'. This paper may be considered particularly important in that Thompson is a high ranking official in the US State Department and has a long experience of energy policy in developing countries 35 . The argument advanced in this brief essay is that the widespread failure of power sector reform in many countries can be put down to the fact that such reforms rarely took place with a deep understanding of the It is now clear that some of the determinants of successful electricity sector reform must include that the model of reform is "sensible" in relation to local conditions, that there is sufficient technical competence (within both the regulator and the utilities to implement reform) and an ability to maintain independence between the regulator and the regulated. But in addition to all these arguments resistance to change can also be attributed to long standing vested interests, and because many countries lacked the capacity to undertake the reforms and to regulate the new market. The early regulators were often seconded from the utility and saw their future within the utility. This posed an immediate conflict of interest and increased the risk of regulatory capture.
This shortage of electricity supply and under investment has had a number of consequences which frame the political economy of current policy and investment options. First, it has resulted in a massive investment in highly inefficient and hugely expensive small "self generation" or emergency supply units, ranging from large plant at factory level down to small petrol engines at the level of rich households and enterprises. One particular beneficiary of this situation has been the highly profitable UK company called Aggreko. The huge extent and high cost of their investment in Africa is set out on their website. The IEA (and the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic) have carried out special studies showing the huge proportion of power supplies that are currently provided by these very high-cost "emergency" supplies in Africa The new direction to power sector reform has resulted from the application of political economy analysis. The World Bank has led this development of a more nuanced and politically smart approach. This is exemplified by the pioneering research by Brian Levy in Zambia where a political economy approach was used to negotiate sector reform 40 . This experience led directly to the World Bank changing its strategy at least in the power sector of Zambia by applying a more nuanced 'politically smart' approach in 2007. When this strategy was later subject to a World Bank review some years later they found that the new policy had indeed successfully broken the log-jam of power sector reform 41 .
Levy uses a political economy perspective to describe the changes in the Zambia infrastructure including electricity, water and telecommunications. From a situation of considerable power surplus, the situation deteriorated over time, with no new capacity being added to the system, and the numbers of staff rose drastically as did their salaries (forming some 50% of the utility, costs This approach has now been elaborated built into the World Bank's "Problem-Driven Governance and Political Economy Analysis: Good Practice Framework. This is discussed in more detail in the section on Methods, below.
The Political Economy of Feed in Tariffs (FIT)
A sub-set of issues of power sector reform has been the development of incentives to encourage private investment in electricity service generation and delivery. This is in some way the converse of fossil fuel subsidies mentioned earlier. Subsidies are provided for two main reasons: to enable poor people to use modern energy services (without the ability to pay the full cost of electricity services); and to encourage renewable sources of energy which are produced at higher cost than fossil options. This latter arrangement is usually described as Feed In Tariffs (FIT).
Subsidies are political in that they essentially transfer resources from one part of the economy to another (e.g. from rich to poor, from urban to rural, or from conventional suppliers to suppliers of renewables)
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. This issue is elaborated below on page 22The political economy of energy "access" and the distribution of energy services 42 Tanenbaum et al note that " "Tanzania's Rural Electrification Authority (which has received funding from the World Bank and other donors; see http://www.rea.go.tz) currently offers grants of $500 to Small Power Producers for each new rural customer that is connected by suppliers (isolated or connected mini-grid operators) other than the national utility. These grants are typically disbursed in tranches: 40 percent on signing the grant agreement, 40 percent on delivery of the connection materials to the village, and the remaining 20 percent on verification of the actual connections. Because the REA's goal is to maximize new customer connections, it does not distinguish between different sources of generation in giving these grants. In other words, the REA grants are provided on a per connection basis regardless of whether the electricity supplied comes from a renewable generator, a diesel generator, or a hybrid generating system. A similar arrangement exists in Mali" (p131)".
A recent publication from the World Bank addresses the specific issue of energy subsidies from a political economy perspective 43 . This report by Masami Kojima, Robert Bacon, and Chris Trimble has a promising title and sets out to cover "approaches to political economy analysis, tools available, and methodological issues" (p4). It provides an excellent review of the evidence about the economic reasons for energy subsidies which in "Sub-Saharan Africa are substantial and highly regressive" (p4). And it notes that "While subsidies can be quick, easy, and politically expedient to implement, they are equally quick to take root and challenging to remove. Optimal policies that are technically sound and welfare enhancing over the long run have nevertheless been found difficult to launch and even more challenging to sustain. Of the barriers to reform, those associated with political economy are among the most powerful, yet their analysis is often lacking due consideration in the reform design process" (p4).
But the report comes to conclusion that "While there are a fair number of papers chronicling subsidy reform episodes and drawing lessons or analysing the distributional effects of power subsidy reform, there are fewer papers explicitly addressing the political economy of subsidy reform" (p7). The authors argue that "the perceptions, activities, motivations, and impact of public officials deserve more systematic analytic attention than they have been given"(p 26).
From the point of view of political economy, they come to the very important conclusion that there is widespread ignorance of the nature and consequences of existing subsidies at this level. This suggests that research can determine the factual basis of people's concerns and enable different coalitions for change to be created. For this reason they also stress the need to analyse the distributional effects of subsidies on different stakeholder groups at the micro level (p25).
Overall the study is important in that it confirms the view within the World Bank that political economy analysis is necessary, and implies that the Bank will generate many such studies in future. They stress that local organisations are crucial both in collecting and analysing the necessary data, but also in ensuring there is sufficient internal discussion between stakeholders about Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) as an important tool in understanding these distributional effects of policy change.
On the question of feed in tariffs, there are also many analyses of their economics 44 , but there is also a growing recognition that the setting of the appropriate rates is highly political, and whether or not FIT meet the need, is largely a political question An interesting indirect consequence of the relative failure of power sector reform is the development of new energy service provision outside the regulatory authority. Thus it might be argued that the relative success of Photo Voltaic systems in Kenya is an index of the utility to meet the needs of people through grid extension It should also be noted in passing that the issues concerning the regulatory framework necessary for private sector service providers applies a fortiori to the whole process of Connection charges also provide good example of the political economy of perverse incentives: the World Bank study states that "the usually cited reasons for high connection charges in rural Sub-Saharan Africa are costly engineering and construction standards, poor or corrupt procurement practices, and overpriced contracts with equipment suppliers. While these are true, national utilities may intentionally charge high connection fees to rural customers as a way to avoid compliance with government mandates on rural electrification (p128).
An insight into the realities of feed in tariffs is provided in a recent comprehensive statement about the terms and conditions of feed-in tariffs in Africa is provided by the World Future Council (WFC), . This provides details for many African countries in a standard easily comparable format. (see annex 3 below for an example of Tanzania). innovation. A balance has to be struck between providing some form of time-bound protection to infant innovations, and ensuring that such protection is not just another mechanism for rent-seeking behaviour.
The Political Economy of Power Pools
According to many sources 48 , the least cost and probably least carbon electricity options for sub-Saharan Africa would be to use electricity generated by hydro from large dams in neighbouring countries that have surpluses or large un-tapped hydro potential.
While such operations are technically complex and expensive in terms of initial capital investment, the major barriers are widely recognised to be 'political'. "The politicians' instinct for equating the location of domestic generation on national territory with energy security is understandable, but it can have cost implications which prejudice other development objectives" (p7).
But in addition there are the "Seldom acknowledged political costs, such as providing an excuse for internal political oppression along the route of the line, providing one country with political power over another, involving countries in each others' internal affairs (for example, by creating exposure to instability in a neighbour), creating opportunities for corruption (which can in turn affect the political balance of power within the country), creating political costs in protecting the line (where the line presents a hostage to be used in extortion by local groups), and creating political costs in the process of tariff rationalization (UN-DESA, 2005). Depending on how these costs are managed they can present barriers to integration, as for example when costs would be borne by politically powerful interest groups" (p8).
This topic is currently the subject of a World Bank (ESMAP) flagship review to be undertaken in 2015. This study identifies "Political Economy" as one of the major barriers to development and will endeavour to summarise evidence to this effect. The proposal states that "Energy security is a concern in almost every country, meaning governments are thinking even more 'nationally' about generation. This impedes the ability to plan and prioritize projects with a regional lens e.g. regional least cost power development plans. Very often, governments are quick to fall back on national least cost power development plans".
The Political Economy Analysis of Low Carbon Growth
This is probably the area of greatest growth in the political economy of energy in recent months. At one level the issue can be simplified to question driving political economy analysis as: who obstructs/drives the adoption of specific sustainable energy policies in specific countries (see footnote 58).
But a review of the literature suggests that analytically there are at least four subdivisions of political economy work in this area. The first two are probably outside the scope of this review and will no doubt are being dealt with under DFID's environmental department: Inter-generational distribution of costs and benefits , covering issues both of climate change over long periods of time, and the political issue of GHG "legacy" of those countries that are now rich because of profligate use of fossil fuels and those that feel they are prevented from low cost growth due to new GHG targets.
The focus here will be on the second two sub-divisions, namely:
The political economy of the energy mix and the shift to renewables. The political economy of energy "access" and the distribution of modern energy services between different groups with an economy.
The political economy of the energy mix and the shift to renewables
There would appear to be two levels of political economy issues: first is the trade-off between low carbon energy and energy at the least financial cost. As one African regulator observed to the World Bank, "Look, we have so many rural communities that don't have any electricity at all. We don't have the luxury of saying that electrification should only be done with green electricity. Our villages are desperate for electricity-they don't care whether the electrons are green, purple, or black." Tanenbaum: p22. This issue will be dealt with in the next section on "access".
The second issue of political economy concerns the political forces in favour and against low carbon options on the supply side. This has been subject to a number of excellent studies in recent months.
Perhaps the most useful is by Peter Newell and his colleagues who have applied a political economy perspective to Low Carbon Energy in Kenya
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. This very competent analysis can be said to meet some of the challenges set out by Hudson and Leftwich (referred to in footnote 5 above). In particular they sought to explore key political questions about the role of actors, interests and institutions in what they call a "just transition to a lower carbon economy that delivers poverty reduction and climate resilience at the same time" and by explicitly examining the issues of political power.
The authors draw on the macro level diagnosis of the Kenya context offered by the Kenyan Drivers of Change paper for DFID by Ng'ethe, Katumanga, and Williams, in 2004 51 that suggests that "the political elite have been able to capture public institutions and resources to serve their private interests" and that the "key challenge will be to strengthen the voice and organisation of all citizens, the poor in particular to exert pressure on the elite" (quoted on page 10). But they go on to open up the complexity of competing objectives in the energy and related sectors, the changing aims and aspirations of different interest groups over time, and the powerful effects of incumbency (who "fiercely resist change"p20), path-dependency and the "contingent" nature of the political process in which the 'unexpected' discovery of fossils fuels "potentially re-shapes the balance of power between donors and the Kenyan state" (p 30). They add to the complexity of the analysis by disaggregating the idea of "power", into at least three types: discursive power ("who gets to define what is clean, green and affordable"p11", institutional power ("where does power lie within and across government and is it reinforced or undermined by actors beyond the state, especially donors" p11) and material power ("who controls the finance, technology and means of producing 'clean energy'"). They also use the idea that there are different "pathways" through which objectives can be achieved and how "the winners and losers from different pathways and on whose terms and how the trade-offs between competing policy objectives are resolved" p3).
But central to the whole analysis is the central focus on the trade-off between different objectives, particularly poverty reduction, economic growth and environmentally sustainable development. Each objective has its advocates and opponents. For instance, they conjecture that "fossil fuels might come to be preferred by commercial and state elites for their ability to service broader growth objectives through the scale of generation capacity. There may also be a rent-seeking dimension in terms of the ability of government officials to maintain control over access to sites, infrastructures and profits flowing from fossil fuels more easily. This could explain part of the appeal of geothermal: its ease of control by state elites" p15. Similarly they note (p 30) that "The drivers of policy have not, on the whole, been concerns for pro-poor energy access, but rather concerns around energy security and the competitiveness of industry in Kenya" and this goes some way to explain the finding that "the new government's statements around energy rarely refer to energy access for the poor" (p17). Indeed they draw attention to "the widespread perception that the low carbon energy access agenda is a very donor driven one" (p30).
The research provides many insights into the messy and complex nature of the political economy of energy in Kenya. It notes for instance the development and subsequent rejection by the President of the Climate Change Authority Bill (p24) and a similar effort to remove VAT from imported Photovoltaic systems which was again reversed in a larger (and more powerful) reform of the tax system (page 28). And underlines "the importance of understanding and engaging 'turf-wars' over ..." (p25) . They also believe that recent efforts at devolution provide a new political space in which political forces can be realigned and policies changed (p25).
Other researchers have addressed the political forces at work in the introduction of renewable energy through the lens of political economy. Much of this analysis has concentrated on South Africa. For instance, Lucy Baker examines this question in the context of South Africa, where electricity is embedded in a traditionally coal-dominated sector 52. The paper is important for showing just how far analysts can go in gaining insights into the complex world of the political economy of energy policy through a largely narrative approach.
Baker argues that the governance of South Africa's electricity is inextricably bound up with the country's historical dependence on cheap coal for export-oriented industry and complex political and economic legacy which has shaped its minerals-energy complex. Political economy should in his view start with a critique of contemporary neoliberal capitalism. By this he means the "political-economic complex of contemporary (hyper-) capitalism in the era of neoliberal hegemony. Hence, this includes both the politicaleconomic system of capitalist production and social relations, as well as the politicalideological framework that supports and legitimates it" (p3954). "As such, a critical political economy approach must provide a sounder analytical basis for discussing the real 53 "While the activities of the electricity sector are mainly governed by the 2006 Electricity Regulation Act it is not always clear how and where policy is being made. This research has found that while the DoE is responsible for setting energy policy and planning, in reality formal and informal influence over many decisions made in the DoE's name is exerted by national entities such as Eskom, Treasury, Department of Public Enterprises, metropolitan and municipal governments, and the Inter-Ministerial Committee on energy. Less publicly, other stakeholders such as the Energy Intensive User's Group which consumes around 40 per cent of the electricity sold in South Africa ....and Eskom's coal-suppliers appear to be incredibly influential .... The DoE often delegates to Eskom on matters of planning, as it did with the IRP 2010. The Department of Public Enterprises meanwhile has oversight responsibility for Eskom, while NERSA though unable to make decisions outside of the IRP, determines electricity tariffs, sets the conditions under which electricity may be sold in the country, approves licenses for generation, distribution and transmission, and oversees the import, export and trading of electricity". Ford, L., 2003. Challenging global environmental governance: social movement agency and global civil society. Global Environmental Politics 3 (2), 120-134. p. 121. determinants of the current 'axes of the energy debate' (energy inequality and energy sustainability)" (p3957).
He recognises that "this might sound awkward to some observers who feel that we need to be more practical and 'problem-solving' in These issues of changing the energy mix were also addressed in relation to renewable energy projects implemented by the UNDP with GEF funds in two Asian countries, namely Malaysia and the Philippines. Adam Burke used a pragmatic political economy analysis approach and summarised the results of these two studies in a policy paper 56 . This perspective produced a number of important conclusions that are grounded in the reality of these two countries and explains why current "incentive and power structures scaling up renewable energy in these countries will be limited". Reviewing these literatures suggests that political economy analysis offers both an explanation of the difficulties of implementing a low carbon strategy, but it also offers insights as to how these barriers might be dealt with. In particular it would seem that disaggregating the problem in terms of the different actors might offer a new perspective in forming alliances for change. In particular, distinguishing between those people who are already heavy producers of greenhouse gases, but have the funds and capacity to change their behaviour and invest in new technology, and those (such as poor people) who do not and have not contributed significantly to global emissions, but have little capacity to change their behaviour or pay for more expensive renewable energy.
It would also appear that the world has experience about what constitutes research in the area of low carbon development. The huge synthesis of experience that has been brought together in the Green Growth Best Practice 59 suggests for instance that it is more persuasive to analyse the full range of options and being transparent about assumptions and data . 
The political economy of energy "access" and the distribution of energy services
Many of the issues of the political economy of energy poverty have been touched upon in earlier sections. Clearly the level of energy subsidy for both fossil fuels and renewables affects poor people, as does power sector reform and the failure of utilities to extend the grid on a financially viable basis.
Furthermore the fundamental truth is that poor people do not have access to modern energy services because they are poor. And we can therefore expect that the forces in society that keep people poor will be among the same forces that prevent poor people gaining access to modern energy services.
But there have been great successes, probably none more so than in China (but many countries of South and South East Asia have substantially reduced energy poverty in the past 20 years). China achieved this by massive transfer of resources from East to West. And it is likely that cross subsidies within power utilities will be required to enable poor people to increase their use of modern energy services: that is that richer elements in society and private sector consumers will have to pay slightly more for their grid electricity, so that an effective service can be provided to poorer people.
Decentralised energy solutions (both with diesels and renewables) offer possibilities in remote locations, or where the utility is dysfunctional. But it is unlikely that these systems can provide connections to electrical power (rather than milliamps for lighting and mobile phones) unless through effective grid extension.
Whatever approach is taken, it is likely that reform of the regulatory systems remains at the heart of an effective response. A strong case for this proposition is contained in the recent World Bank publication on mini-grids 60 . This report draws on a huge amount of experience of attempts to bring electricity to people through small power systems and notes that small power producers and distributors are "unlikely to invest unless regulations and policies are clear and credible"(p1) . But such regulation (or in its absence natural monopolies) gives opportunities for certain players to gain excessive economic 'rents', defined as abnormal profits in excess of the price required for a producer to be willing to produce. Mechanisms are required to keep this rent in control and to provide orderly and harmonised operation of the system. These mechanisms involve both formal and informal mechanisms, and their effective implantation. In addition to formal legal and regulatory rules of operation, there are also more informal "rules of the game" that determine how the systems operate in the real world.
Energy and gender
An important sub-set of the political economy of energy access is provided by those many people who have focussed their attention on energy and gender. While little of this work has had a specific political economy focus, a great deal more is expected in the coming months when a major DFID funded programme gets fully underway 61. It is clear from the work so far that the impact of efforts to increase energy access are determined in large part by the choice of end-use technology (maize milling machines have a different impact to a TV) and this in turn often varies between men and women 62 .
Methods
It does not appear that "energy" represents a particularly difficult or methodologically complex sector in which to apply the 'political economy perspective'.
The review of the literature shows that considerable progress can be made through 'mere' description: identifying who the key actors are and asking them about their interests and their perception of the 'rules of the game'. The case study of power sector reform in Zambia also showed what progress can be made through a clear understanding of the actors involved, and the formation of progressing coalitions of interest.
But the literature also shows that there are many dimensions to the concept of 'depth'. The Marxists see depth in exploring the fundamental forces of capitalist development (as with Bram Buscher 63 and Kannan and Pillai achieved through detailed description and the identification and naming of particular individuals who play a powerful role in the development of a particular sector in a neoPatrimonial state (though their report was judged so sensitive that it has not been published). He adopts an approach that is very similar to that cited above from the UK Cabinet Office. This goes through a sequence of making an inventory of existing policies and stakeholders, mapping of stakeholders according to priority sectors and according to their influence, with the objective of identifying coalitions for change. Within this process, he suggests overlaying the various narratives of the actors that "compete for attention. Narratives play a big role to capture why some actors are keen to advance certain policies as opposed to others. Whether actors are interested in climate change for the sake of preserving their environmental legacy or to preserve their competitive edge vis-à-vis other actors, they are likely to frame their policy choices around specific narratives. Narratives can be complementary or openly conflictive with policy priorities; narratives can bring together different actors or split similar ones". Schmitz then summarises the results in a diagram that locates each of the actors in a space formed by the degree of influence and the priority issues: carbon emissions, energy security, job creation and competitiveness. From this, possible coalitions for change might be identified.
From amongst the large number of so-called 'how to' manuals suggesting how political economy analysis might be carried out, it would appear that the leading methodological contender for "problem focussed PE analysis" is provided by Fritz, V., K. Kaiser, and B. Levy. 2009 . "Problem-Driven Governance and Political Economy Analysis: Good Practice Framework", Washington DC: World Bank.
Conclusions
Providing modern energy services required for economic growth, the reduction of poverty, and do so in ways that are less polluting is clearly a complex and expensive task. Progress to date, particularly in Africa, has been far more modest than anticipated, and far less effective than required to meet the need.
It is now widely accepted that many of the constraints to the effective implementation of energy investments are associated with what is described as the 'political economy'. This is not to diminish the roles played by lack of capacities, and the inadequate working of capital and other markets. But it does point to an area of neglect. It seems likely that more effective policy and action can be informed by more and deeper research on the political economy of the areas listed in this paper. Indeed success has been demonstrated to require . Such research should complement rather than replace other important research into the financial, technical and economic issues.
Despite the criticism, it appears that considerable progress can be made by the simple application of largely descriptive methods to identify who the stakeholders are, and to understand what they believe are the incentives and disincentives that they face. In such work, context is everything. Location specific research is required that builds on utilising deep local knowledge so as to understand the precise configuration of political forces and interest groups, and what motivates them. It is likely that this type of research needs to be informed by an historical perspective which provides insight into how the system operates. Even so valuable research could be undertaken to push the methodological frontier in the application of political economy analysis and related methods 69 . Subsidies for fossil fuels will need to be removed, while subsidies to enable poor people to gain access to modern energy services (and possibly to encourage low carbon development) are likely to have to increase. These processes are intensely political, with clear winners and losers.
The literature also suggests that research into the underlying 'factual basis' of each interest group's position is useful to determine whether the actors' perceptions of the impacts of change (for instance in relation to subsidies or low carbon growth) are valid and to feed in such information into the process of building coalitions for change.
In this context the World Bank makes an important suggestion that more research is needed to understand the distributional effect of policy change (see footnote 43 above). Similarly research is needed to develop effective compensation mechanisms, given that current mechanisms appear to be widely captured by the elite.
But in case this summary produces too optimistic a picture, it must be accepted that the over-arching political environment in Africa may not be conducive to change.
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This phrase comes from Sue Unsworth, Politically smart, locally led development: main findings from a workshop on 18 th February 2014 sponsored by the Policy Practice and IDL Group, October Gallery London.
The main findings of a recent workshop on reviewing six potential success stories of political economy analysis suggests that there were common themes in programmes where policy makers accepted that development is a political process and is primarily locally driven. These common factors included:
Local This politically smart project management usually involved some form continuing political economy analysis, which was "embedded in project thinking and contributed to politically smart ways of working" p 5 69 "To date, the literature relying on new institutional economics to examine power sector reform has been thin and relatively weak. It seems to suffer from shortcomings in theory, data, and/or methodology" p22, see reference 43).
